singhski 2025-05-27 11:38 a.m.Cleveland Ins. Co. v. Globe Ins. Co., 98 U.S. 366, 374 (1878) (Clifford, J., dissenting) (“Rules of practice are established to promote the ends of justice, and where it appears that a given rule will have the opposite effect from that which it was intended to accomplish, courts of justice have never hesitated to establish an exception to it.”).
But—“[t]he requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows…from the Due Process Clause.” Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). It “represents a restriction on judicial power…as a matter of individual liberty.” Id. Thus, before a court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
So 7(d) still promoted the ends of justice, because personal jurisdiction flows from the Due Process Clause. Before a court can resolve a case, it “must have the power to
decide the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction).” Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 563 (2017). It's an incredibly big ask from the Plaintiff, to strike down a portion of the Rules of Procedure agreed upon by the rest of the Judicial Conference.
When a district court is “unable to hear a claim, because of lack of jurisdiction or some other legal hindrance,” it “has no choice but to dismiss.” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 136 (1995). In this case, the only Things to be Remembered is the spirit of 7(d), why it exists, and why we must respect it instead of abandoninig it de facto using inadequate systems which have procedural defects—namely, lacking the initial pleading, which is a unequivocal requirement for proper service.(edited)